Film is unfair to General Browning - A Bridge Too Far (1977) Discussion

[–] 14 years ago

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[–] murad23 14 years ago

Blaming Montgomery doesn't fly. Nor does attempting to exhonerate Browning, who suppressed clear information that major German armor was in the area.

The pressure for Market Garden came directly from London. Churchill's government (and its opposition) were insisting an immediate neutralization of the V2 sites in Holland.

And when Montgomery came up with plans the first one was nixed by the allies, and the second one, Market Garden was given about half the resources in the planning proposal by Eisenhower.

Eisenhower and Bradley were looking to limit US casualties, and believed, that simply keeping pressure up on the broadest possible front would lead to a Wehrmacht collapse.

And you have the facts backwards, Montgomery did not rush, nor did he beleive the German Army was "beaten" (You are ascribing Eisenhower view to Montgomery!)

From Wikipedia:
"Eisenhower, convinced that German forces faced imminent collapse, was equally adamant that advance on a broad front was correct. However, he consented to Operation Market Garden, giving it "limited priority" in terms of supplies but as part of his advance on a broad front.[41] Eisenhower promised that allied aircraft and American trucks would deliver 1,000 tons of supplies per day.[42] In vain, Montgomery complained about this to the Vice-Chief of the Imperial General Staff in London, Lieutenant-General Sir Archibald Nye."

(Eisenhowers promise of 1000 tons turned out to only be about 650 tons per day)

Also Browning does bear a good deal of blame for when it come to teh battle hardened panzer devisons in the area.
"Further information about the location of the German Panzer Divisions at Arnhem was revealed by aerial photographs of Arnhem taken by a photo-reconnaissance Spitfire IX from RAF's No. 16 Squadron,[92] as well as information from members of the Dutch resistance.[93] Fearing that 1st Airborne Division might be in grave danger if it landed at Arnhem the chief intelligence officer of the division, Major Brian Urquhart, arranged a meeting with Browning and informed him of the armour present at Arnhem. Browning dismissed his claims and ordered the division's senior medical officer to send Urquhart on sick leave on account of 'nervous strain and exhaustion.'[94]"

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[–] dazfiddy 14 years ago

Thank you for this.

I accept that General Browning must take his share of the blame for some of the failures such as the refusal to heed the intelligence regarding the Panzers at Arnhem.His failure to raise any doubts is one that we will see repeated again and again in history by other men.The factors of ego,career advancement and the fear of rocking the boat all come into play.As the film portrays him, Browning is clearly a fan of Montgomery,today we would call him a cheerleader.

However, if you read Cornelius Ryan's book A bridge too far,there is a lot of detail about the relationship between Montgomery and Eisenhower. Montgomery had very low regard for Ike's battlefield experience, forgetting that as Supreme Commander, there was a huge political dimension to his job.The relationship became quite acrimonious, especially as Montgomery wanted to pursue his single thrust strategy.He believe that this advance would lead to Germany's defeat by 1944.He also wanted to be put in charge of all the land forces, which Ike could never agree to. Montgomery was not a well liked man at SHAEF HQ.He had to be kept on side for the sake of the alliance and the conduct of the war.

Operation Market Garden is in part Eisenhower's attempt to appease Montgomery,one of his most able commanders.Montgomery sold it to Eisenhower, convincing him that an airborne drop and then an armoured thrust into Germany would succeed.

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[–] jeffrey-nimmo-1 13 years ago

Something that everyone seems to miss in the discussion about Eisenhower's decision-making process: what the results would have been had Market-Garden been a success. We would be across the Rhine, having outflanked the fortifications of the Siegfried line, and might have been able to push into the Ruhr valley. No commander ever knows for certain what the outcome of a battle will be, and he has to measure any possible losses against the possible gains. I can't see any reasonable commander refusing to implement Market-Garden, when you consider what they knew at the time (one intelligence officer's concerns do NOT constitute foreknowledge).

By the way, I agree that the film is unfair to Browning, particularly at the end, where they have him saying that he always thought they were trying for a bridge too far, making it seem that he is lying or making excuses, when in fact he DID raise that concern early in the planning stage.

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[–] Hotrodder 13 years ago

Omar Bradley thought it right for Eisenhower to supprt the plan. He described it as "one of the most imaginative plans of the war" IIRC. To me though it was a classic attempt to exploit the apparent collapse of the enemy's defence and it failed in part because the enemy rallied and because of the deploying of 2nd SS Panzer Corps purely by sheer fluke to the Arnhem area.

"I was left in no doubt as to the severity of the hangover when the cat stamped into the room."

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[–] Squeeth2 13 years ago

I wonder if Eisenhower was regretting his twin advance policy already, so backed Monty again but too little too late. I think that it failed because of lots of small mistakes which with the indifferent weather (not unusual in September) made it fail. The biggest mistake for me was that the speed in laying it on allowed the Air Force barons to reassert themselves after their defeat in Normandy, hence all those landing zones miles from bridges and no coup de main parties landing on top of them.

Marlon, Claudia and Dimby the cats 1989-2005, 2007 and 2010.

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[–] deeveed 13 years ago

The biggest mistake for me was that the speed in laying it on allowed the Air Force barons to reassert themselves after their defeat in Normandy, hence all those landing zones miles from bridges and no coup de main parties landing on top of them.

I think that was considered one of the main reasons why Mkt-Garden failed. The other was the "Garden" component of the plan which was Horrocks' XXX Corps. In hindsight, I can't see how the planners figured Horrocks could get his tanks "up the road" quickly and on time to support the airborne groups. In order for MG to succeed Horrocks had to push and push and push and get to the bridges but he didn't. For me, it's intriguing to figure what would've happened say if Patton was commanding XXX Corps instread of Horrocks. He was a very offensive general though I'm aware that he would've been limited to maneuver there.

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[–] BuddyLove63 13 years ago

In order for MG to succeed Horrocks had to push and push and push and get to the bridges but he didn't.

In order for Market Garden to succeed the actual BRIDGES should have been captured and ready for XXX Corps to cross over when they got there.

They were not.

For me, it's intriguing to figure what would've happened say if Patton was commanding XXX Corps instread of Horrocks.

Not much difference. Patton was far better racing along roads when there was little in his way.

He was a very offensive general

Only when the Germans weren't being stubborn or dug in. He went almost nowhere in the Lorraine for almost 4 months.

though I'm aware that he would've been limited to maneuver there.

Most definitely. There is only so much you can do with one main highway and against a stubborn enemy.

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[–] deeveed 13 years ago

Most definitely. There is only so much you can do with one main highway and against a stubborn enemy.

But you know I still don't understand how the planners felt that Horrocks could do it considering the "one" highway" though. I think it was one of those thiogs where the negative was relegated to the back room with XXX Corps. In hindight, MG on paper was a pretty good plan to hit the Reich but execution took its lumps. (I can see the problem if Patton was in there as you note but the fact that he would be there would bring up some interesting personality issues between him and say higher command such as Montgomery as to how the battle should have evolved. Of course, Patton would be subordinate but perhaps his at times prickly personlity could've pushed Montgomery to view XXX Corps predicament differently..just supposing here)

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[–] BuddyLove63 13 years ago

But you know I still don't understand how the planners felt that Horrocks could do it considering the "one" highway" though.

It all boils down to a total underestimation of the enemy. That is largely why Market Garden failed. The premise of the venture, even if the Arnhem bridge had been taken and crossed, was misguided. The Germans were stronger than anyone expected them to be.

Montgomery and XXX Corps couldn't have just waltzed through north western Germany. Sooner or later they would have been halted and possibly even cut off. The Germans had Waffen SS units re-fitting there plus other Panzer Brigades in the close vicinity.Not to mention two Tiger units with combined around 60 Tigers not too far away.

The Germans had a pretty potent overall armoured force in the north west Germany/Holland area.

The American had problems later when they tried to advance to the Rhine in October. They didn't get much further than Aachen and even that took enough trouble.

I think it was one of those things where the negative was relegated to the back room with XXX Corps. In hindight, MG on paper was a pretty good plan to hit the Reich but execution took its lumps.

I don't think it was a good plan myself. The plan would only have been good if the Germans were as weak as the allies thought they were. The plan would have been a very good one in that sense, but it wasn't in actuality.

(I can see the problem if Patton was in there as you note but the fact that he would be there would bring up some interesting personality issues between him and say higher command such as Montgomery as to how the battle should have evolved.

Hehe well that's one thing the higher command would not have wanted.

Besides, Patton's Third Army was way further south in the Lorraine, south of Luxembourg. Geographically in no position to influence Market Garden. Patton would have had to give up command of Third Army in the Lorraine to take over or be involved with Market Garden in the north. Impossible really, and all hell would have broken loose, especially from the British.

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[–] deeveed 13 years ago

Impossible really, and all hell would have broken loose, especially from the British.

hehehhe ..oh yeah. I've got pictures of Montgomery and Patton together and of all things...smiling to each other. I cojld imagine what it was like behingd close doors.

All in all, you're correct in noting that the Allies really failed to see how strong the Germans were. A certainly bad execution for MG.

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[–] IronHorseColonel 8 years ago

Horrocks was the least of their problems. He performed more than admirably. To begin with how would Patton feel being demoted to command a Corps? Patton would have *beep* a brick and then tried to kill Ike with the same brick. The next problem is the national integration. There was rarely ever any Integration in the ETO below the Army Level, at least of the intentional kind. To put an American Corps as the primary and sole ground unit under a British Army (2d) simply wasnt going to happen.

My opinion has always been that Horrocks did an amazing job. In combat you don't always have to achieve the victory conditions of the original mission in order to get a win. They mere fact that he was able to remain near fully intact as a fighting force is AMAZING given the circumstances they came up against. His Corps suffered under 1500 casualties, a lesser Commander very well could have been completely routed. Horrocks coming out of the battle in the condition he did was a win.

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[–] gary_w_trott 8 years ago

I can see what you mean about putting Browning's quote at the end of the film rather than at the beginning. I think that the reason was probably cinematic rather than historical because that is a powerful closing line to the film.

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[–] fredgarv79 13 years ago

yes from what I read, monty took his time to build up his forces. he was not one to hurry things but it did say that his ego certainly got in the way and everybody really did NOT like him.

but this book I read today says that the germans really were in very bad shape at this point, but that we actually stopped a bit, and that gave them time to regroup. we waited a bit too long to launch this market garden and the germans knew something was coming. it said the germans were really down to scattered bits here and there but that they managed to regroup barely in time. also the simple fact that even though they mostly knew they couldn't win, they thought we might as well be professional and fight with honor. after all they were protecting their home territory. one german thought why are these people from another continent 4,000 miles away here fighting?

the thing that really makes you wonder, is they thought they could go up this narrow road for quite a distance. ok drop people behind the lines to take bridges etc, but to rely on going up this narrow road quite a ways to get to them in the face of german ss seems today very questionable indeed

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[–] darthkarl66 9 years ago

You're wrong about a few things. Market-Garden was Monty's baby all the way. he was indeed in a hurry and fairly desperate to forestall Patton from reaching Germany first.

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[–] blanche-2 13 years ago

John Coldstream's biography of Dirk Bogarde covers the General Browning controversy very well. Since Hollywood wasn't going to involve Montgomery or Patton as characters, and the financing of the film was American, they needed a scapegoat, preferably British. When Daphne du Maurier saw the script, she was very upset and complained to Attenborogh.

When the film was released, since Browning had been so respected and well known, there were whole editorials written about how bad the film made him look. No one was as upset as Dirk Bogarde who lived next door to the Attenboroughs. He disinvited them for Christmas and a rift was caused between he and Attenborough that was never really fixed.

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[–] jeffrey-nimmo-1 13 years ago

I don't understand. Why did he agree to play the part if he felt it treated Browning so badly? Or was he just upset about the bad press?

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[–] blanche-2 13 years ago

He didn't know General Browning, so he was unaware that the script treated him unfairly. Also Daphne du Maurier asked Attenborough for changes that he didn't make, apparently.

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[–] Hancock_the_Superb 13 years ago

Money and the chance to co-star wtih so many big name actors. That's the impression I got from skimming through one of Bogarde's biographies.

"I may not punish you for treason, but I could slap you for stupidity."

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[–] DD-931 13 years ago

"It all boils down to a total underestimation of the enemy. That is largely why Market Garden failed."

There is only one word I disagree with in BuddyLove's assessment. "Largely".
No, underestimation of the enemy is EXACTLY why Market Garden failed.

You can blame Monty, you can blame Browning, you can blame the American paratroopers. But the fact is, when you look how far this operation got, the conclusion must be reached that without the unexpectedly high level of German resistance, Market Garden would have succeeded. Even with the one road.

Sometimes the reason one side lost is because the other side won.

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[–] nickm2 13 years ago

Well that brings to mind my favorite quote by Monty; when asked why Market Garden failed, he replied that the Germans had a lot to do with it.

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[–] MerchantVenturer 12 years ago

There is no doubt that Browning was a first-rate commander who really did lead and care for his men.

The problem was that he too often came across as arrogant and over-reliant on 'bull'. He believed that discipline was the key to success for any group of soldiers and this was always his over-riding concern all through his long military service.

It was always said of him that he wouldn't order any of his soldiers to do something he hadn't done himself at some point. There aren't too many senior military commanders like that.

He was a fascinating character. Apart from being married to Daphne du Maurier, in his younger days he represented England at athletics (hurdles), was an Olympic bobsleigh competitor, an excellent horseman, was extremely well-read and had other abiding interests such as boating and ballet.

There seems little doubt that the film did do him an undeserved disservice and, has been said, Bogarde was extremely upset at the reaction to his portrayal: not because he was being criticised as an actor but because of the anger of so many of Browning's former colleagues - of all ranks - that brought home to Bogarde the fact that the film was inaccurate.

It seems to be accepted that there needed to be a scapegoat, for dramatic purposes if nothing else, and he certainly wasn't going to be an American - for all sorts of obvious reasons that don't need spelling out. Browning had a superficial air of a Colonel Blimp, especially to many Americans, so he became the obvious choice.

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[–] 12 years ago

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[–] DD-931 12 years ago

Certainly. "Fighting within sight of the Fatherland soil" was the reason for the blunting of the Allied advance all across the front in late 1944. Patton had the same difficulties to the south at that time.

Personally, I think the problem the Allied leaders had was in grasping why the Germans, geared toward conquering the world and clearly headed for inevitable defeat, would continue to fight on the defensive for a losing cause with such dedication and commitment. To the point that neither the Americans NOR the British believed the Germans would mount the kind of major offensive they pulled off only two months later at the Battle of the Bulge.

What they may have missed is that Hitler had always defined the Nazi cause in terms of the survival of the Aryan race. And as the German people were pushed into the corner, one has to wonder if their methodical campaign of extermination against the Jews suggested in their minds that their own extermination wasn't so terribly far-fetched.

The Americans and British, without the slightest thought towards any plans to actually exterminate the German people, may have missed this. Of course the Soviets wouldn't have minded a world without Germans, but I'm sure Stalin wasn't going to bring up those kinds of impulses with Churchill or FDR.

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[–] libertarian45 10 years ago

So, let's do some Mon morning QBing...just for fun. If you could go back in time and affect this battle, what would you do?

As stated, the big problem was underestimating the enemy strength. Aside from knowing this for sure, what more could be done?

- knowing the threat, perhaps more risk could have been accepted to tpt aircraft in order to get 1 AB Div closer to the bridge initially.
- more gliders with special jeeps, anti tank guns etc committed initially to Arnhem (knowing that most would be lost). Gliders were the only method to get vehicles, trailers, towed guns etc into the DZ. Lot's more towed anti tank guns would have been helpful (see the famous pics of Brit paras using them during the battle - something not depicted in the film). These would be more effective than PIATs, however, the latter are good for close in tank hunting team ambushes - flank shots from alleys and tree lines.
- more risk accepted re fog etc in order to get Poles in
- possibly reinforcing 82nd and 101st with a follow on wave with an additional Div or 2 (if aircraft could be scrounged). As earlier stated, XXX Corps was making decent time despite the single road and the delays at Son Bridge and Nijmegan really slowed things down. UK 6 AB Div (which included the First Canadian Para Bn) was not committed after Normandy and, I believe, there was another US Div 17th?) that could have been used. Imagine the forces at Nijmegan and Either Eindhoven or Arnhem being doubled. Granted, they wouldn't really be needed in Eindhoven and their presence there likely would not have speeded up the bailey bridge at Son. Also, Arnhem chewed up 8,000 paras. Sending in another 10,000 may have just resulted in more losses if they couldn't be resupplied or had insufficient anti tank weapons.
- radios/signals situation sorted out prior to inserting
- committing another formation behind XXX Corps onto the congested road. One issue cited was the corps getting bogged down in street fighting. Perhaps, by utilizing "harbour areas" to get XXX Corps out of the way, a fresh armoured div could have been pushed forward to take over the lead, bypassing trouble spots and leaving them to be mopped up by XXX Corps or the additional para divs added later. This fresh div could be purposely better kitted out with better boats etc to aid in getting more infantry over the river at Nijmegan and also force crossings at the Rhine in order to bolster 1st AB Div.

Anyway, just fanciful stuff. I think the operation had merit. It is studied at Army Staff College as an example of maneouverist thinking - something the Germans were good at. Maneouvre warfare dictates that one try to avoid hitting the enemy head on at his strongest area. One is to find a weaker spot and pry it open with a concentrated force. That's what Monty was attempting as opposed to Eisenhower's "advance on a wide front". Flooding allies into the Rhur may well have succeeded. I think much of what I imagined above hinges on greatly increasing the support to the operation. Had it been more of a "full court press", it may have had a better chance. However, with the benefit of seeing what happened in the Ardennes a little over 2 months later, it may have resulted in some disastrous counter attacks further south.

Another point to consider is the inability to use Antwerp as a resupply port. This was due to the failure to clear the long Scheldt estuary which lead from the sea to Antwerp. The Allies held Antwerp, but, could move no shipping to it. As such, the logistic tail still relied on ships landing on the Normandy coast. When the problem was realized, the job of clearing the Scheldt was given to First Canadian Army generally around the SAME TIME as Market Garden! The Scheldt operation suffered as a result and led to some of the heaviest Canadian casualties of the war. Of course, being a Canadian operation, no one ever makes movies about it or talks about it. In the end it took heavy bombing from the RAF and a Brit amphibious assault to finish the job. Given how critically important Antwerp was, many argue that more support should have been thrown into the Scheldt clearance before MG was launched. Of course, the Germans would have had even more time to refit, so....

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[–] sambuca62 9 years ago

Are you sure about how Browning was perceived?

I thought the American generals were very critical and concerned that the British generals did not get down and dirty in the details. They did not greatly understand how tactical battles were fought on the ground. Whereas I got the impression that American generals were closer to the tactical details.

There definitely seems to be something to this. Particularly when you consider the the British high command's disregard of the German armor divisions and the decision to land paratroopers too far from their objectives.

So much has been made of Montgomery's propensity for detailed planning. Anyone who has worked in business knows colleagues who plan everything down to the minute to the last detail, but in totality can't get anything done. This is the impression I get of Monty.

So there is the dichotomy which might not be much of a dichotomy. The American generals don't think the Brits understand the war on the ground while Monty's reputation is for too much planning and not enough action. I think Monty's approach would be described today as "paralysis by analysis".

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[–] Hotrodder 9 years ago

I thought the American generals were very critical and concerned that the British generals did not get down and dirty in the details. They did not greatly understand how tactical battles were fought on the ground. Whereas I got the impression that American generals were closer to the tactical details.

That's a ridiculous assumption- all generals of either army had different abilities. Some in either army were excellent tacticians, some weren't. There was very little wrong with Miles Dempsey and Brian Horrock's tactical abilities and of course there were also useless British generals with their abilities lodged firmly in the past.
Whereas the US army had excellent generals like Hodges and Simpson they also had generals like Lloyd Fredendall who was frankly bloody useless. Even Patton didn't do that well at Metz did he?

...the decision to land paratroopers too far from their objectives.

A decision that had to made because of the refusal by the USAAF not to fly to close to the objectives due to heavy flak concentrations, so it was the Americans that can largely take the blame here.

So much has been made of Montgomery's propensity for detailed planning. Anyone who has worked in business knows colleagues who plan everything down to the minute to the last detail, but in totality can't get anything done. This is the impression I get of Monty.

Monty did pretty well by his planning. You seem to forget that M-K was his only failure and that it failed due to many reasons, not least the presence of 2nd SS Panzer Corps. Without the sheer fluke of 2nd SS Pz Corps being moved to the Arnhem area the plan may well have worked.

The American generals don't think the Brits understand the war on the ground

Did the American generals understand the war on the ground at Kasserine Pass? At the beginning of the Battle Of The Bulge?

Trust me. I know what I'm doing.

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[–] Buddy-Love63 9 years ago

Yeah I don't understand this Hotrodder. The US Army certainly didn't perform any better than the British Army, either in North Africa, Italy, Normandy or Germany.
It can even be argued that the American Hurtgen Forest and Ardennes blunders were worse than Market Garden, with far higher casualties.

Did the American generals understand the war on the ground at Kasserine Pass? At the beginning of the Battle Of The Bulge?

Or Hurtgen Forest. Or Metz.

The Hurtgen Forest mess was probably least clever allied attack of 1944/45. Nothing to do with the British that.

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[–] Buddy-Love63 9 years ago

Also, the German commanders in the Lorraine were not impressed by the American leadership in that campaign, of which Patton was the boss.

General Hermann Balck, who took command of Army Group G in the Lorraine in September 1944, did not think highly of Patton at all and said

"I have never been in command of such irregularly assembled and ill-equipped troops. The fact that we have been able to straighten out the situation again…can only be attributed to the bad and hesitating command of the Americans and the French"

In 1979 Balck recalled, "Within my zone, the Americans never once exploited a success. Often von Mellenthin, my chief of staff, and I would stand in front of the map and say, ‘Patton is helping us: he failed to exploit another success."

Balck called the American leadership under Patton "poor and timid".

Waffen SS Gruppenfuhrer Max Simon said the American tactics in the Lorraine were "cautious and systematic" and that "The tactics of the Americans were based on the idea of breaking down a wall by taking out one brick at a time," and that "Had you made such attacks on the eastern front, where our anti-tank guns were echeloned in depth, all your tanks would have been destroyed."

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[–] Buddy-Love63 9 years ago

Also, the German commanders in the Lorraine were not impressed by the American leadership in that campaign, of which Patton was the boss.

General Hermann Balck, who took command of Army Group G in the Lorraine in September 1944, did not think highly of Patton at all and said

"I have never been in command of such irregularly assembled and ill-equipped troops. The fact that we have been able to straighten out the situation again…can only be attributed to the bad and hesitating command of the Americans and the French"

In 1979 Balck recalled, "Within my zone, the Americans never once exploited a success. Often von Mellenthin, my chief of staff, and I would stand in front of the map and say, ‘Patton is helping us: he failed to exploit another success."

Balck called the American leadership under Patton "poor and timid".

Waffen SS Gruppenfuhrer Max Simon said the American tactics in the Lorraine were "cautious and systematic" and that "The tactics of the Americans were based on the idea of breaking down a wall by taking out one brick at a time," and that "Had you made such attacks on the eastern front, where our anti-tank guns were echeloned in depth, all your tanks would have been destroyed."

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[–] robrosenthal1 9 years ago

Almost every reply in this thread points out at least one additional problem with the Market Garden plan - the single road (reliance upon which, in my view, was THE most significant miscalculation in the whole scheme), underestimating the ability of the Germans to recover from their forcible expulsion from France, the failure of planners to insist upon coup de main drops on the bridges themselves, the failure to make use of the available intelligence regarding the presence of German armor in the Arnhem area (and make no mistake, the evidence is clear that such intelligence did exist and not just from compromised Dutch resistance sources), the radio communications problems (which likely would have been discovered and rectified if not for the fact that for the operators, this plan went from approval to execution in SEVEN days), etc.

In light of all that, it is ridiculous to claim that it was a good plan overall that fell just short. Rather, it was a good general IDEA but had inherent fatal flaws all over the place and it was only through the incredible efforts and heroism of the Allied servicemen and their Dutch allies that it came as close to succeeding as it did.

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[–] nelson95 9 years ago

A lot of the trivia remarks I've seen about this movie have stated that Dirk Bogard's portrayal of Browning is very controversial, is your statement the reason why?

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[–] markhagner-1 9 years ago

Per Wikipedia Browning blamed the Polish Brigade and the British quietly shipped him to India and was never promoted again. So you can figure out who to blame. I always wonder though what would have happened if Patton's army had led the charge. Also why didn't the allies just stay on the ground they captured. We didn't invade Holland until the wars end outside of Antwerp which they needed.

Wonderland Exile

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[–] IronHorseColonel 8 years ago

Regardless who you blame, MG was a victim of optimistic planning. You absolutely never plan optimistically in tactical combat operations. You always plan for the worst and anticipate your plan falling apart at the first sign of combat.

Brereton was as responsible as Browning for the optimistic planning. Montgomery set high standards and his subordinates did not want to disappoint. Were they going to go forward no matter what? I suspect so. Had they told Montgomery they had doubts would Montgomery have still gone forward? I suspect so. Dempsey disagreed with MG plan, Montgomery wasnt phased. They all allowed it to happen, they are all responsible and they are all guilty in my opinion of dropping the ball.

Generals deserve blame. They never deserve sympathy and they sure as hell never deserve as much credit as they usually get. Horrocks and to a lesser extent Dempsey do in fact deserve quite a bit of credit even in the face of a failed operation. They saved 1000s of men in XXX Corps in the face of pretty dire conditions. Browning and Brereton can't say the same. And thats the thing about Airborne Operations, once you drop them behind enemy lines there aint much you can do. And the absolute garbage plan they dropped the 1st Allied Airborne Army into was wholly their fault.

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